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INTRODUCTION
Australia is a modern society and is highly 
dependent on key critical systems at the na-
tional and state level. These key systems have 
become more dominant as the Information Age 
has developed. These key systems are grouped 
together and described as critical infrastructure; 
this is infrastructure so vital that its incapacity 
or destruction would have a debilitating impact 
on defence and national security (Lewis, 2006). 
Many of these critical systems are based upon 
ICT (Information and Communication Technol-
ogy) systems.
Australia takes ICT security very seriously, 
it has been estimated that Australian organisa-
tions spend between A$1.37 – A$1.74 billion 
per year on IT security, and the total financial 
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ABSTRACT
Australia	has	developed	sophisticated	national	security	policies	and	physical	security	agencies	to	protect	
against	current	and	future	security	threats	associated	with	critical	infrastructure	protection	and	cyber	war-
fare	protection.	In	this	paper,	the	authors	examine	some	common	security	risks	that	face	Australia	and	how	
government	policies	and	strategies	have	been	developed	and	changed	over	time,	for	example,	the	proposed	
Australian	Homeland	Security	department.	This	paper	discusses	the	different	steps	that	Australia	has	under-
taken	in	relation	to	developing	national	policies	to	deal	with	critical	infrastructure	protection.
losses due to computer-related security incidents 
in the 2006 financial year have been estimated to 
be between $595 and $649 million (Australian 
Institute of Criminology, 2009).
This paper will review the current strategies 
used by Australia over a decade and evaluate 
their differences and discuss the reasons for 
these differences. Future threats such as Cyber 
Warfare and the steps that are being proposed 
will be considered. This paper will highlight 
current Australian best practices in critical 
infrastructure and cyber warfare protection 
many of which may be applicable in a European 
context and provide an informative contrast.
Initial View of the Australian 
Federal Government
The initial focus of the Australian Federal Gov-
ernment policy was that critical infrastructure 
protection was a commercial consideration DOI: 10.4018/ijcwt.2011010104
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and related to Information Security (Busuttil 
& Warren, 2004).The Australian Federal Gov-
ernment has been aware of the problems that 
Australian corporations may have with dealing 
with these new security issues. The Australian 
Federal Government has responded by offering 
advice for corporations. The initial Australian 
Government advice (Australian Government: 
Attorney-General’s Department, 1998) sug-
gested ways in which organisations could reduce 
Critical Infrastructure Protection risks (Busuttil 
& Warren, 2004):
• Organisations should implement protective 
security such as passwords, etc., in accor-
dance to a defined security standard such 
as as/nzs 4444 (now 17799) (information 
security management);
• Organisations should formally accredit 
themselves against security standards such 
as as/nzs 4444 (17799);
• Organisations should raise awareness of 
security issues such as password security, 
e-commerce risks among their staff;
• Organisations should train their staff in 
how to use computer security systems ef-
ficiently and effectively.
This advice was subsequently updated and 
in 2004 the Australian Government responded 
with new security advice (Department of the 
Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2004):
• The Australian and New Zealand Standard 
for Risk Management AS/NZS 4360:1999 
is the standard by which all critical infra-
structure will be assessed to assist with 
the review of risk management plans for 
prevention (including security), prepared-
ness, response and recovery.
In 2004 the Australian Federal Government 
formally defined the following; “Critical infra-
structure is defined as those physical facilities, 
supply chains, information technologies and 
communication networks which, if destroyed, 
degraded or rendered unavailable for an 
extended period, would significantly impact 
on the social or economic well-being of the 
nation, or affect Australia’s ability to conduct 
national defence and ensure national security” 
(Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 
2004). In essence this description describes 
organisations that exist at a government level 
or at a corporate level (Department of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet, 2004).
Historically, much of Australia’s infra-
structure was originally owned and operated by 
the public sector at the federal, state and local 
government levels (Smith, 2004) however the 
majority of Australia’s critical infrastructure 
has now been privatised and is under private 
sector ownership. Consequently, protecting 
Australia’s critical infrastructure now requires 
a higher level of cooperation between all levels 
of government and the private sector owners. 
Hence, the federal government has developed a 
policy for critical infrastructure protection that 
focuses broadly on addressing the following 
strategies (Department of the Prime Minister 
and Cabinet, 2004; Australian Government: 
Attorney-General’s Department, 2004):
• Distinguishing critical infrastructures and 
ascertaining the risk areas;
• Aligning the strategies for reducing poten-
tial risk to critical infrastructure;
• Encouraging and developing effective 
partnerships with state and territory gov-
ernments and the private sector;
• Advancing both domestic and interna-
tional best practice for critical infrastructure 
protection.
As Warren and Leitch discussed (2010), 
the Australian Federal Government recog-
nised the importance of crucial systems and 
the development of new industry support 
mechanisms, in particular Trusted Information 
Sharing Network (TISN).
The TISN is a forum in which the owners 
and operators of critical infrastructure work 
together by sharing information on security is-
sues which affect critical infrastructure (TISN, 
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2007). TISN requires the active participation 
of Critical infrastructure Protection owners and 
operators of Critical infrastructure Protection, 
regulators, professional bodies and industry 
associations, in cooperation with all levels of 
government, and the public. To ensure this coop-
eration and coordination, all of these participants 
should commit to the following set of common 
fundamental principles of Critical infrastructure 
Protection (TISN, 2007). These principles are 
(TISN, 2007; Warren & Leitch, 2010):
1.  Critical infrastructure Protection is centred 
on the need to minimise risks to public 
health, safety and confidence, ensure 
economic security, maintain Australia’s in-
ternational competitiveness and ensure the 
continuity of government and its services;
2.  The objectives of Critical infrastructure 
Protection are to identify critical infra-
structure, analyse vulnerability and inter-
dependence, and protect from, and prepare 
for, all hazards;
3.  As not all critical infrastructure can be 
protected from all threats, appropriate risk 
management techniques should be used to 
determine relative severity and duration, 
the level of protective security, set priori-
ties for the allocation of resources and the 
application of the best mitigation strategies 
for business continuity;
4.  The responsibility for managing risk within 
physical facilities, supply chains, infor-
mation technologies and communication 
networks primarily rests with the owners 
and operators;
5.  Critical infrastructure Protection needs 
to be undertaken from an ‘all hazards 
approach’ with full consideration of inter-
dependencies between businesses, sectors, 
jurisdictions and government agencies;
6.  Critical infrastructure Protection requires 
a consistent, cooperative partnership be-
tween the owners and operators of critical 
infrastructure and governments;
7.  The sharing of information relating to threats 
and vulnerabilities will assist governments, 
and owners and operators of critical infra-
structure to better manage risk;
8.  Care should be taken when referring to 
national security threats to critical infra-
structure, including terrorism, so as to avoid 
undue concern in the Australian domestic 
community, as well as potential tourists 
and investors overseas;
9.  Stronger research and analysis capabilities 
can ensure that risk mitigation strategies 
are tailored to Australia’s unique critical 
infrastructure circumstances.
Recent Australian Federal 
Government Strategy
In 2008 the Australian Federal Government 
identified a number of new security challenges, 
“it	is	increasingly	evident	that	the	sophistica-
tion	of	our	modern	community	is	a	source	of	
vulnerability	 in	 itself.	 For	 example,	 we	 are	
highly	 dependent	 on	 computer	 and	 informa-
tion	 technology	 to	 drive	 critical	 industries	
such	as	aviation;	electricity	and	water	supply;	
banking	and	finance;	and	telecommunications	
networks.	 This	 dependency	 on	 information	
technology	makes	us	potentially	vulnerable	to	
cyber	attacks	that	may	disrupt	the	information	
that	increasingly	lubricates	our	economy	and	
system	 of	 government” (Rudd, 2008). This 
public acknowledgement by the Australian 
Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, identifies the new 
security challenges facing critical infrastructure 
protection and highlighted the following secu-
rity concerns (Rudd, 2008):
• Maintaining Australia’s territorial and 
border integrity;
• Promoting Australia’s political sovereignty;
• Preserving a cohesive and resilient society 
and strong economy;
• Protecting Australians and Australian in-
terests both at home and abroad;
• Promoting a stable, peaceful and prosper-
ous international environment; particularly 
in the Asia-Pacific region, together with a 
global rules-based order which enhances 
Australia’s national interests.
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In 2009 the Federal Australian Government 
has responded to the issues regarding cyber se-
curity and critical infrastructure by proposing a 
coherent and government led approach to critical 
infrastructure protection. The primary objec-
tives identified focus on all areas of Australian 
society where there are security risks, e.g., that 
individuals should be aware and take steps to 
“protect their identities, privacy and finances 
online” (Australian Government, 2009) that 
businesses and the government operate “secure 
and resilient information and communication 
technologies” and trusted electronic operating 
environment that supports Australia’s national 
security and maximises the benefits of the digital 
economy (Australian Government, 2009). The 
Australian Federal Government also has devel-
oped a wide range of new strategic directions 
to focus Australia’s cyber security programs 
(Australian Government, 2009):
• Improve the detection, analysis, mitiga-
tion and response to sophisticated cyber 
threats, with a focus on government, 
critical infrastructure and other systems 
of national interest;
• Educate and empower all Australians with 
the information, confidence and practical 
tools to protect themselves online;
• Partner with business to promote security 
and resilience in infrastructures, networks, 
products and services;
• Model best practice in the protection of 
government ICT systems, including the 
systems of those transacting with govern-
ment online;
• Promote a secure, resilient and trusted 
global electronic operating environment 
that supports Australia’s national interest;
• Maintain an effective legal framework 
and enforcement capabilities to target and 
prosecute cyber crime;
• Promote the development of a skilled 
cyber security workforce with access to 
research and development to develop in-
novative solutions.
As part of the 2009 Australian Federal 
Government strategy, a new of number bodies 
were developed with new capabilities. These 
include (Australian Government, 2009):
• CERT (Computer Emergency Response 
Team) Australia:
 ◦ This new Government body has moved 
to a national CERT strategy to enable 
a “more integrated, holistic approach 
to cyber security across the Australian 
community”.
• Cyber Security Operations Centre (CSOC).
 ◦ The core functions of the CSOC are 
focused mainly on government, in-
frastructure and critical private sector 
systems and aims to be a source for all 
issues related to awareness (especially 
the detection of sophisticated threats) 
and a facility to respond to cyber se-
curity risks and problems which are 
of national importance.
Another key aspect of CSOC is that it pro-
vides Australian Defences with a cyber warfare 
capability and provides a resource designed to 
service all government agencies (DSD, 2011).
The Australian Federal Government has 
started to refocus away from Critical Infra-
structure Protection to Critical Infrastructure 
Resilience. The Australian Attorney General 
Robert McClelland announced that “The time 
has come for the protection mindset to be 
broadened – to embrace the broader concept 
of resilience”. The aim is to build a more re-
silient nation – one where all Australians are 
better able to adapt to change, where we have 
reduced exposure to risks, and where we are 
all better able to bounce back from disaster” 
(TISN, 2010a).
The Australian Federal Government in 
2010 launched the new	Critical	Infrastructure	
Resilience	Strategy. The aim of this new strategy 
is the continued operation of critical infrastruc-
ture in the face of all hazards as this critical 
infrastructure supports Australia’s national 
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defence and national security and underpins 
our economic prosperity and social wellbeing. 
More resilient critical infrastructure will also 
help to achieve the continued provision of es-
sential services to the community (Australian 
Government, 2010). The new strategy intro-
duces a number of new concepts (TISN, 2010b):
• Critical	infrastructure	resilience – the abil-
ity to reduce the magnitude, impact or dura-
tion of a disruption to critical infrastructure 
whatever its cause. So if essential services 
are damaged or destroyed, they can get 
up and running again quickly. This is an 
important part of creating a nation where 
all Australians are better able to adapt to 
change, have reduced exposure to risks, and 
are better able to bounce back from disaster.
• Mutual	 responsibility – the responsibil-
ity of Critical infrastructure resilience 
management and operation is shared be-
tween the owners and operators of critical 
infrastructure, and all levels of govern-
ment – Australian, state and territory, and 
local. The owners and operators of critical 
infrastructure are primarily responsible for 
ensuring the security of their assets.
DISCUSSION
The major issue facing Australia is the cur-
rently adopted distributed model of critical 
infrastructure protection and decision making 
and how that can effectively manage and se-
cure Australia’s critical infrastructure. Whilst 
it is commendable that an Australian Federal 
Government has faced the issue of critical 
infrastructure and cyber threats, the fact that 
this approach attempts to cover the entirety of 
Australia may in itself be problematic. There 
has been some streamlining of operations by 
nationalising CERT, however there are still a 
number of separate agencies that are involved 
in this process; Attorney-General’s Depart-
ment (AGD), the Australian Communications 
and Media Authority (ACMA), the Australian 
Federal Police (AFP), the Australian Security 
Intelligence Organisation’s (ASIO), the De-
fence Signals Directorate (DSD), the Depart-
ment of Broadband, Communication and the 
Digital Economy (DBCDE), the Australian 
Government Information Management Office 
(AGIMO), the Joint Operating Arrangements 
(JOA) and the Cyber Security Policy and Co-
ordination (CSPC) Committee. It is clear that 
there has been an overall Government shift 
to form two “umbrella” agencies (CERT and 
CSOC) to monitor, promote and control cyber 
threats however complexity will still arise as 
there as so many sub agencies that are involved 
in this process. In an area such as cyber security 
where speed is often of upmost importance to 
limit damage, the interaction of a large number 
of other agencies will surely slow this process 
down. If an Cyber attack occurs in real time 
against Australia, would they be able to react 
and make decisions in real time, or would the 
distributed model actually impact the decision 
making process?
Another unique issue that relates to Aus-
tralia is the federated government system con-
sisting of a federal government and a number 
of state governments. A key issue is that when 
Figure	1.	Stages	of	Australian	changes	in	strategies
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an attack occurs against an infrastructure at a 
state level that the response time to escalate the 
decision making process to the Federal govern-
ment may be slow. This time lag could cause 
serious consequences and limit the effectiveness 
of these agencies.
Over time the major shift in Australian 
policy has been the move from Information 
Security Protection to Cyber Resilience, which 
is shown in Figure 1.
A new interesting factor with the introduc-
tion of CSOC is the move away from civilian 
organisations protecting Australia’s critical 
infrastructure and cyber security risks and mak-
ing defence organisations responsible for this 
role. This may heighten the chance of attacks 
against Australia’s critical infrastructure be-
cause it could be considered a military target.
CONCLUSION
Australia over the last decade has taken major 
steps in the protection of its national critical 
infrastructure. The Australian model is a work-
able model that has helped to protect Australian 
critical infrastructure against physical and cyber 
risks. The issue is whether the distributed model 
will work in a real time situation and whether 
the time delays would impacts the decision 
making processes.
A new emerging issue is the focus upon 
Critical Infrastructure Resilience and the future 
impact that this may have upon Australia.
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